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A Laboratory Investigation of Compliance Behavior under Tradable Emissions Rights:
Implications for Targeted Enforcement
1. Introduction
Although often overlooked, one of the most important design elements of any regulatory policy
is how compliance with the policy will be enforced. Within the context of designing emissions
trading programs, several authors have provided theoretical analyses of compliance incentives,
the consequences of noncompliance, and strategies for enforcing emissions trading programs
(e.g., Keeler 1991, Malik 1990, 1992, and 2002, vanEgteren and Weber 1996, Stranlund and
Dhanda 1999, Stranlund and Chavez 2000). Taken as a whole, this literature suggests that firms’
incentives toward noncompliance in market-based regulation, as well as the design of
enforcement strategies to counteract these incentives, are quite different from compliance and
enforcement of other policy instruments, particularly command-and-control regulations.
While there is a substantial body of economic theory about compliance and enforcement in
emissions trading programs, there is limited empirical evidence regarding the determinants of
compliance decisions in these programs. In this paper, we report the results of a series of
experiments designed to examine some key factors that may affect compliance decisions. Our
primary interest is whether differences in the individual characteristics of firms generate different
compliance choices. This is an important issue because, on the face of it, one may suspect that
firms with different production processes, abatement technologies, or initial allocations of
permits may have different compliance incentives. If this is true, then regulators will be
motivated to choose a targeted enforcement strategy, in particular targeted monitoring effort,
which is conditioned on firm-level characteristics.
Regulators might use information about firm-level determinants of compliance behavior in
different ways depending on what their enforcement objectives are. If some firms tend toward
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higher violations than others, then a regulator that is primarily motivated to detect those with
higher violations will direct a greater share of his enforcement effort toward these firms. On the
other hand, suppose that a budget-constrained regulator seeks to distribute his enforcement effort
to minimize aggregate violations.1 In this case, the regulator is not necessarily concerned about
whether some firms have higher violations than others. His main concern is to direct his
enforcement effort to where it is most productive. That is, he will monitor more closely those
firms that are more responsive to increased enforcement than others, regardless of violation
level.
Conceptually, Stranlund and Dhanda (1999) show that the individual compliance choices of
risk neutral competitive firms in emissions trading programs are independent of differences in
any firm-level characteristic. Consequently, regulators have no reason to condition their
enforcement effort on firm-level characteristics. Their reasoning is straightforward. Since
compliance in emissions trading programs means that a firm holds enough permits to cover its
emissions, a risk neutral competitive firm’s marginal benefit of noncompliance is what it has to
spend for permits to make sure it is compliant; that is, the prevailing permit price. Thus, a firm’s
compliance decision is made by comparing this permit price with the marginal expected penalty
for emissions in excess of permits. Since this marginal benefit-cost comparison does not depend
on anything unique to a particular firm, the compliance decision is independent of any firm
characteristic.
This result contrasts sharply with the effects of firm-level characteristics on compliance with
command-and-control standards. A risk neutral firm’s decision about whether to comply with a
fixed emissions standard should be determined by the relationship between its marginal
1

In the case of uniformly mixed pollutants, this is equivalent to seeking to reduce the environmental damage from
noncompliance. If pollution is not uniformly mixed, then regulators may wish to target enforcement effort at firms
that have greater impacts on environmental quality. We do not address this possibility in this paper.
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reduction in abatement costs from exceeding the standard and the marginal expected penalty it
faces for the resulting violation. Therefore, firms with higher marginal abatement costs or who
face stricter standards will have a greater incentive to be noncompliant. In this way, firm-level
characteristics are important determinants of compliance with fixed standards (Garvie and Keeler
1994). A recent paper by Gray and Shadbegian (2004) finds strong support for this conclusion in
their analysis of compliance behavior by pulp and paper manufacturers.
Our experimental results are largely consistent with the general hypothesis that individual
compliance decisions in emissions trading programs are independent of differences in firms’
characteristics, but not completely so. We find that individual violations are independent of
parametric differences in their abatement costs. However, individual violations are not
independent of the initial allocation of permits. What appears to matter most about the initial
allocation of permits is how it determines who will sell permits and who will buy them. We find
that those subjects who are predicted to buy permits tend to have higher violation levels than
those who are predicted to sell permits. We also test whether the marginal productivity of
increased enforcement in reducing individual violations varies according to differences in
abatement costs and initial allocations of permits, and find that the marginal productivity of
enforcement is statistically independent of firm-specific characteristics.
We also ran a series of experiments in which subjects faced fixed emissions standards to
compare compliance behavior under emissions trading and emissions standards. These
experiments were identical to our market experiments, except that subjects could not trade their
initial allocation of permits. The results of these experiments provide an empirical study of how
different compliance behavior is under the two types of policies. Consistent with theoretical
expectations (e.g., Garvie and Keeler 1994), subjects with higher abatement costs had
significantly higher violations and were much more responsive to increased enforcement.
3

Clearly our results have important implications for designing enforcement strategies for
competitive emissions trading programs. There is little empirical justification for targeting firms
in these programs based on differences in their characteristics. While our results suggest that an
enforcer whose objective is to detect and penalize firms that tend toward higher violations may
wish to monitor permit buyers more closely, irrespective of abatement costs, there appears to be
no justification for targeting firms to maximize the productivity of enforcement resources. Under
fixed emissions standards, however, there is substantial justification for targeted enforcement
strategies that are conditioned on information about firms’ abatement costs
Although experimental techniques have been used to evaluate other policy initiatives,
including some aspects of emissions trading programs (e.g., Cason 1995, Cason and Plott 1996,
Ishikida et al. 1998, Isaac and Holt 1999), these techniques have not yet been widely applied to
issues of regulatory enforcement, much less to compliance behavior in emissions trading
programs.2 However, laboratory experiments are particularly useful for an inquiry into the
determinants of compliance in these programs, because the opportunities for empirical analyses
of compliance behavior in existing trading programs appear to be very limited at present. Some
programs have achieved such high rates of compliance that there is simply is not enough
variation in compliance decisions to conduct meaningful econometric analyses. For example, the
enforcement strategies of the Sulfur Dioxide Allowance Trading program and the RECLAIM
program of southern California were clearly designed to achieve very high rates of compliance,
and have been largely successful in doing so (Stranlund, Chavez, and Field 2002). Other
emissions permit markets have not yet fully developed. This is the case for the emissions trading
program for total suspended particulates in Santiago, Chile (Montero, Sanchez, and Katz 2002).
In fact, because so few trades have taken place in this program, Palacios and Chávez (2004) were
2

See Alm and McKee (1998) for a review of the experimental literature that focuses on tax compliance.
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forced to assume that sources in this program faced fixed standards to conduct an empirical
analysis of compliance behavior in this program.
We are aware of only two papers that use laboratory experiments to examine compliance
behavior in emission permit markets. Cason and Gangadharan’s (2004) experiments involve
emissions trading when emissions are stochastic, permits can be banked, and subjects’
performance is audited based on their past compliance history. This design allowed them to
identify interesting interactions between random emissions shocks, permit banking, and
compliance. Our approach is much simpler: emissions are deterministic, banking permits from
one period to the next is not allowed, and audits are completely random with a known and
constant probability. This approach allows us to generate fundamental results about the potential
for targeted enforcement in emissions trading programs that Cason and Gangadharan do not
consider.
Murphy and Stranlund (2004) is closely related to our current work in terms of design, but
has a different focus. That work considers the effects of changing enforcement strategies on the
permit market, and in turn the indirect effects of enforcement on compliance behavior. Although
identifying the direct and indirect market effects of enforcement is also important to us in this
paper, Murphy and Stranlund (2004) do not examine how the marginal productivity of
enforcement may vary across firms, and hence, they do not draw conclusions about whether
targeted enforcement is appropriate in emission trading programs. In addition, their work focuses
solely on imperfect compliance. We include treatments in which subjects are predicted to be
perfectly compliant so that we can examine firm-level determinants of compliance over the full
range of enforcement strategies, from weak enforcement with significant noncompliance to
strong enforcement that is sufficient to induce perfect compliance. Finally, neither Cason and
Gangadharan (2004) nor Murphy and Stranlund (2004) conduct experiments with fixed
5

emissions standards to draw conclusions about how compliance decisions differ under marketbased and command-and-control regulation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present a positive theory
of compliance in a competitive emissions trading program to develop the hypotheses to be tested.
In section 3 we provide details of the experiments we designed to conduct these tests. The results
of the experiments are presented and discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.

2. Theory and Hypotheses
Consider a fixed number of risk neutral firms in a perfectly competitive emissions trading
program.3 The abatement costs of firm i are summarized by c(q , θ i ) , which is strictly
decreasing and convex in the firm’s emissions qi. Heterogeneity of the firms is captured by the
parameter θ i , and we assume that total and marginal abatement costs are increasing in this
parameter. A total of Q emissions permits are distributed to the firms, free of charge. Firm i
receives l0i permits initially, and holds li permits after trading in a compliance period is complete.
Competitive behavior in the permit market establishes a constant price per permit p.
If firm i is noncompliant, then its emissions exceed the number of permits it holds and the
magnitude of its violation is vi = qi – li > 0. If the firm is compliant, qi – li ≤ 0 and vi = 0. To
check for compliance, each firm is audited with a known probability π. A firm that is found to be
in violation is assessed a penalty, f(vi, φ). There is no penalty for a zero violation, but for positive

3

None of the results that we present in this section are new, so we do not provide rigorous derivations. Interested
readers should consult Stranlund and Dhanda (1999) for a complete analysis. It is important to note that the
theoretical model we use in this paper can easily be applied to other tradable property rights programs. For
example, recent papers by Hatcher (2005) and Chavez and Salgado (2004) are direct applications of the literature
on compliance and enforcement of emissions trading to individual transferable fishing quotas. Thus the results of
this paper apply more broadly than just emissions trading.

6

violations, the penalty is positive, strictly increasing and strictly convex. An increase in the
parameter φ increases both total and marginal penalties.
Assuming that each firm chooses positive emissions and permits and never over-complies,
then i’s problem is to minimize its expected costs, c(q i ,θ i ) + p(l i − l0i ) +π f (q i − l i , φ ) , subject to

qi – li ≥ 0. It is more convenient for our purposes to focus on the choices of violations and
emissions rather than on permit demands and emissions. Therefore, we rewrite the problem as
min vi , qi c(q i , θ i ) + p(q i − v i − l0i ) + π f (v i , φ ) , subject to vi ≥ 0. The following first-order

(

)

conditions are both necessary and sufficient to determine optimal choices of violation and
emissions:

Lv = − p + π f v (vi , φ ) ≥ 0, vi ≥ 0, Lv vi = 0;

[1]

Lq = cq (q i ,θ i ) + p = 0.

[2]

These conditions implicitly define a firm’s optimal choices of violation and emissions as
v i = v i (θ i , π , φ , p) and q i = q i (θ i , π , φ , p ). Note that these choices do not depend at all on a
firm’s initial allocation of permits, simply because l0i does not enter either first-order condition.
This implies that individual violation levels and the marginal productivity of enforcement across
firms do not vary with changes in the initial allocation of permits. 4
For the purposes of this study, the most important result from this simple model is that the
decision to comply and the choice of violation level are independent of any firm-specific
characteristics (which are reflected in the parameters θ i and l0i ). From [1] it is easy to establish

4

This is an extension of Montgomery’s (1972) result that emissions choices are independent of the initial allocation
of permits to environments in which firms can be noncompliant. It is well known that this result does not hold in
the presence of market power (Hahn, 1984) or transaction costs (Stavins, 1995). Similarly, compliance choices
will not be independent of the initial allocation of permits in the presence of market power (van Egteren and
Weber, 1996; Malik, 2002; Chavez and Stranlund, 2003), or transaction costs (Chavez and Stranlund, 2004).
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that a firm will be compliant if and only if p ≤ π f v (0, φ ) ; that is, a firm is compliant if and only
if the permit price is not greater than marginal expected penalty of a slight violation. Note that
there is nothing in this decision rule that is unique to an individual firm. Therefore, a firm’s
decision about whether to comply is independent of any of its characteristics. This independence
result extends to the violation level of a noncompliant firm as well. To see this let [1] hold with
equality and substitute the firm’s choice of violation, v i = v i (θ i , π , φ , p) , to obtain

p − π f v ( v i (θ i , π , φ , p )) ≡ 0 .

[3]

Differentiate this identity with respect to θ i to obtain −π f vv vθi = 0, which implies vθi = 0. This
result indicates that firms’ violations are independent of parametric differences in their
abatement costs. Conceptually, therefore, there is no reason for regulators to believe that some
firms will be more likely to be noncompliant or tend toward higher violations even though they
may have very different abatement cost functions or initial permit allocations. Hence, a regulator
that is motivated to target his enforcement resources to detect incidences of noncompliance or
higher levels of violation cannot do so productively on the basis of firm-level characteristics.
On the other hand, a regulator that is motivated to target his enforcement effort where it will
be most productive in reducing aggregate violations will not necessarily care about individual
violation levels, but rather will be focused on the marginal productivity of his enforcement effort
across firms. This matter is complicated somewhat by a unique feature of enforcing marketbased policies: enforcement will have a direct effect on individual violations, as well as an
indirect effect through its impact on the equilibrium of the permit market.
From [3] obtain vπi = − f v / π f vv < 0 and vφi = − f vφ / f vv < 0 , which confirm the unsurprising
results that, holding the permit price constant, firms respond to either increased monitoring or
increased penalties by decreasing their violations. In principle, firms could reduce their
8

violations by purchasing more permits or reducing their emissions. However, [2] indicates that
firms always choose their emissions to equate their marginal abatement costs to the permit price.
This rule has nothing to do with the enforcement strategy firms face. Therefore, again holding
the permit price constant, firms reduce their violations in response to increased enforcement by
purchasing more permits, not by decreasing their emissions.
If every firm increases its demand for permits with increased enforcement, then the
equilibrium permit price must increase. To define the equilibrium permit price, first define the
vector θ = {θ i }i∈N , where N is the set of regulated firms. Given that a total of Q permits are
issued to the firms, and the enforcement authority has committed itself to monitoring each firm
with probability π and imposing penalties with parameter φ, the equilibrium permit price is

p = p (θ , π , φ , Q) . This is the implicit solution to the permit market clearing condition,

∑

N

l i (θ i , π , φ , p) = Q, where l i (θ i , π , φ , p) is permit demand by firm i. It is easy to demonstrate

that the equilibrium permit price is indeed increasing in the enforcement parameters; that is,
pπ > 0 and pφ > 0 . Moreover, an increase in the permit price motivates firms toward higher
violations. To demonstrate this, obtain v ip = 1/ π f vv > 0 from [3]. The intuition here is that the
permit price represents the marginal cost of compliance; thus, a higher permit price increases the
incentive toward noncompliance.
The equilibrium violation of a firm is defined as v i (θ i , π , φ , Q) = v i (θ i , π , φ , p (θ , π , φ , Q) ) .
The marginal productivity of increased enforcement on the violations of firm i is therefore
vπi = vπi + v ip pπ and vφi = vφi + v ip pφ . The direct effect of increased enforcement is to reduce the

violation of an individual firm ( vπi < 0 and vφi < 0 ), but the indirect effect motivates higher
violations ( v ip pπ > 0 and v ip pφ > 0 ). It is easy to show that the direct effect dominates the
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indirect effect so that individual violations fall with increased enforcement. Murphy and
Stranlund (2004) confirm this hypothesis in the laboratory.
Now let us turn to possible differences in the marginal productivity of enforcement across
firms. Suppose that vπi > vπj for two firms, i and j. That is, at the margin, the regulator’s
monitoring effort is more productive in reducing the violation of firm i than firm j. If the
regulator’s objective is to reduce aggregate violations and the marginal cost of monitoring the
two firms is the same, the regulator would be motivated to monitor firm i somewhat more closely
than firm j. Conceptually, however, since a firm’s choice of violation is independent of its type
and its initial allocation or permits, the marginal productivity of the regulator’s enforcement is
independent of these parameters as well.5 This implies that differences in vπi and vπj cannot be
attributed to differences in i’s and j’s abatement costs or their initial allocations of permits.
Matters are very different for firms that face fixed emissions standards. If firm i faces an
emissions standard si, its compliance problem is to choose emissions to minimize c(q i , θ i ) +

π f (q i − s i , φ ) , subject to qi ≥ si. Equivalently, it chooses its violations to minimize c(vi + s i ,θ i )
+π f (vi , φ ) . The first-order condition is cq (vi + s i , θ i ) + π f v (vi , φ ) ≥ 0; if this is strictly positive,
then v i = 0 . Clearly, the firm is noncompliant if and only if −cq ( s i , θ i ) > π f v (0, φ ); that is, if and
only if the firm’s marginal abatement costs evaluated at the standard is greater than the marginal
expected penalty of a slight violation. It is straightforward to show that a noncompliant firm’s
violation is increasing in its marginal abatement costs [ vθi < 0 ] and decreasing in the emissions
standard [ vsi < 0 ]. Thus, a regulator who is motivated to detect and penalize noncompliant firms
and those that tend toward higher violations should target firms with higher marginal abatement
5

i
i
That is, vθi = 0 implies vπθ
= vφθ
= v ipθ = 0 and consequently, vπθi = 0
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costs and/or lower standards. Contrast this to competitive emissions trading for which regulators
cannot use differences in marginal abatement costs or the initial allocation of permits to target
noncompliant firms or those with higher violations.
In further contrast to permit markets, the marginal productivity of increased enforcement
with standards is likely to depend on firms’ abatement costs and emissions standards. Although,
in general, it is not possible to identify the firms for which a regulator’s enforcement effort is
more effective, if firms’ abatement costs and the penalty function are quadratic, as we assume in
i
our experimental design, then it is straightforward to show that vπθ
< 0 and vπi s < 0 . These

indicate that the marginal productivity of increased monitoring in reducing violations is greater
for firms with higher marginal abatement costs or that face lower standards. The same holds for
the marginal productivity of increased penalties. Thus, to use his enforcement resources most
effectively, a regulator is justified in targeting firms with higher marginal abatement costs or
lower standards.
Our results about violation choices, the marginal productivity of enforcement, and the
potential for targeted enforcement are summarized in the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Under a competitive emissions trading program, the violation levels of risk

neutral firms are independent of differences in their abatement costs and their initial allocations
of permits.
Hypothesis 2:Under a competitive emissions trading program, the marginal productivity of

increased enforcement (either increased monitoring or increased penalties) on the violation levels
of risk neutral firms is independent of differences in the firms’ abatement costs and their initial
allocations of permits.
Hypothesis 3: Under fixed emissions standards, the violation levels of risk neutral firms are

higher for firms with higher marginal abatement costs and/or lower emissions standards.
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Hypothesis 4: Under fixed emissions standards, the marginal productivity of increased

enforcement (either increased monitoring or increased penalties) on the violation levels of risk
neutral firms is greater for firms with higher marginal abatement costs and/or lower emissions
standards.

3. Experimental Design and Procedures

3.1 Experiment design
The experiments were designed to test our hypotheses about the relationships between individual
firm characteristics and violation choices, but the subjects were placed in a more neutral
environment. We framed the experiments as a production decision in which permits conveyed a
license to produce, rather than an emissions decision, to avoid introducing potential biases due to
individual attitudes about the environment or emissions trading. During each period of the
experiment, subjects simultaneously chose to produce units of a fictitious good and traded in a
market for permits to produce the good. Participants could produce as many units of the good as
they wished (up to a capacity constraint) regardless of the number of permits that they owned.
However, at the end of the period, each individual was audited with a known, exogenous
probability. If an individual was audited and found to be non-compliant (i.e., total production
exceeded permit holdings), then a penalty was applied.
Subjects received a benefit from their choice of production, q, which was generated from a
linear marginal benefit function bi′ (q ) = 18 − βi q . Each experiment had eight subjects divided
evenly into two types; subjects were randomly assigned a type. Subjects with a high marginal
benefit function ( β H = 1 ) also had a greater production capacity (17 units). Subjects with a low
marginal benefit function ( β L = 2 ) could produce up to 8 units. Production was constrained to be
a whole number. High marginal benefits from production in our experiments are equivalent to
12

high marginal abatement costs in emissions trading. Therefore, throughout the remainder of the
paper we denote subjects with high marginal production benefits as HighMAC subjects, and
subjects with low marginal production benefits as LowMAC subjects.
The treatment variables in this paper are the probability of an audit, the marginal penalty
function, the initial permit allocation, and the total supply of permits. Table 1 summarizes the
experimental design. Each of the twelve cells was repeated three times. Although our main
focus is on compliance behavior in permit markets, we also ran several experiments in which
subjects faced fixed standards to compare compliance behavior under emissions trading and
emissions standards.
To be compliant in the market experiments, subjects were required to possess sufficient
permits, l, to cover their production choices. Limiting the total number of permits imposed an
aggregate production standard. We consider two aggregate standards. In the low aggregate
standard experiments ( QL = 28 ), denoted LowStandard, each of the four HighMAC subjects was
allocated three permits, and the four LowMAC subjects were each given four permits. We call
this the (nearly) uniform initial allocation. In the high aggregate standard experiments
( QH = 56 ), denoted HighStandard, there were two different initial allocations of permits. With a
uniform initial allocation, each of the eight subjects in an experiment started with seven permits.
With a nonuniform initial allocation, the HighMAC subjects began with 13 permits, and the
LowMAC subjects had a single permit. Reallocating the initial allocation of permits in this way
changes the prediction about which subjects would sell permits and which would buy permits. In
the competitive equilibrium, the LowMAC subjects would be the net sellers of permits with the
uniform initial allocation, and net buyers of permits when the initial allocation is nonuniform.
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To check for compliance, each subject’s record was examined with a known probability π.
If a subject was audited and found to be non-compliant, that is q > l, then she was assessed a
penalty that was generated from a linearly increasing marginal penalty function,
f ′(q − l ) = F + φ (q − l ). By changing the parameters of the marginal expected penalty function,

π f ′(q − l ) = π [ F + φ (q − l )], we developed four enforcement strategies, which we label High,
Medium(πH), Medium(πL), and Low.6 The High enforcement strategy involved a high audit
probability and a high marginal penalty function (πH = 0.70, F = 17.5, φ = 1.43). All High
marginal expected penalty treatments were parameterized to induce perfect compliance by risk
neutral agents. With the high aggregate standard, however, the incentives for perfect compliance
were much stronger. For the other three levels of enforcement, subjects were expected to choose
to be noncompliant. The treatments Medium(πH) and Medium(πL) involved the same marginal
expected penalties, but Medium(πH) had a higher monitoring probability and a relatively low
marginal penalty function (πH = 0.70, F = 6, φ = 1.43), whereas Medium(πL) had a lower
monitoring probability and a higher marginal penalty function (πL = 0.35, F = 12, φ = 2.90). Our
intention here was to examine whether the subjects reacted differently to monitoring and
penalties. The Low marginal expected penalty treatments had the weakest enforcement strategy
with the low monitoring probability and a low marginal penalty function (πL = 0.35, F = 2, φ =
2.90). Enforcement parameter values were chosen, in part, so that the expected marginal penalty
functions are parallel to each other—each has a slope of about one.

6

The enforcement parameters were the same for each subject type with the exception that, since LowMAC subjects
could only produce up to eight units, only the first eight steps of the penalty schedule was displayed for them.
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3.2 Experiment procedures
Participants were recruited from the student population at the University of Massachusetts,
Amherst. Subjects were paid $7 for agreeing to participate and showing up on time, and were
then given an opportunity to earn additional money in the experiment. These additional earnings
ranged between $5.68 and $17.49, with a mean of $13.67 (σ = 1.46). Earnings were paid in cash
at the end of each experiment. Each experiment lasted about 2 hours.
The experiments were run in a computer lab using software designed specifically for this
research. To familiarize subjects with the experiments, we ran a series of training experiments.
In the first stage of the trainers, students read online instructions that included interactive
questions to ensure that they understood the instructions before proceeding. After everyone had
completed the instructions and all questions were answered, the training experiment began.
These practice rounds contained all the same features as the “real data” experiments with the
exception that we used a different set of parameters. The data from the trainers were discarded.
For the real data sessions, we recruited participants from the pool of trained subjects.
Subjects were allowed to participate in multiple sessions. A total of 176 subjects participated in
36 eight-person experiments. Prior to the start of the real data experiments, subjects were given
a summary of the experiment instructions.7 The experimenter read these instructions aloud and
answered any questions. Each subject was given a calculator, a pencil and paper. Each
experiment consisted of 12 identical rounds. At the start of each period, the eight subjects were
each given an initial allocation of permits and $10 in experimental cash.
A unique feature of our experiments is that the production decisions and permit market
trading were unbundled into two separate, but simultaneous, activities. We did this to allow for

7

Available upon request.
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the possibility that the production levels and permit holdings could differ, thereby introducing a
compliance decision. During the period and concurrent with the production decision, subjects
had the ability to alter their permit holdings by trading in a continuous double auction. In the
auction, individuals could submit bids to buy or asks to sell a single permit. The highest bid and
lowest ask price were displayed on the screen. A trade occurred whenever a buyer accepted the
current ask or a seller accepted the current bid. After each trade, the current bid and ask were
cleared and the market opened for a new set of bids and asks. The trading price history was
displayed on the screen.
Each period lasted a total of five minutes. The permit market was open for the entire period,
but production had to be completed in the first four minutes. The one-minute reconciliation
period gave subjects a final opportunity to adjust their permit holdings. After each period ended,
random audits were conducted and penalties were assessed. All information relating to audit
outcomes was private.
As noted earlier, we also conducted a series of experiments with a fixed standard for the
subset of treatments in Table 1 that have a uniform initial permit allocation. These standards
experiments were the same as their market counterparts, except that the permits were not
tradable. Therefore, the initial permit allocation became the fixed standard. We use these
treatments to test Hypotheses 3 and 4.
This design yields observations on individual decisions and market outcomes; of particular
interest in this paper are violations and permit prices. Giving subjects different production
benefit schedules and initial allocations of permits allow us to test for the impacts of these
differences on individual violations under both emissions trading and fixed emissions standards
(Hypotheses 1 and 3). Moreover, varying the enforcement parameters allows us to test whether
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the marginal productivity of enforcement is sensitive to differences in production benefits and
initial permit allocations or fixed standards (Hypotheses 2 and 4).

4. Results

We begin our analysis of the results with a discussion of general patterns in the permit price and
individual violations. We use some of these patterns to motivate our econometric model
specifications when estimating these variables. The econometric analysis is used to test our
specific hypotheses. Because our theoretical development suggests that an individual’s violation
decision is conditioned on the permit price, we first estimate this price and then use the estimated
price as an instrumental variable when modeling violation choices. Because individuals make
decisions in multi-round experiments, we control for repeated measures using linear random
effects models. We omit the data from the first period to minimize the effects of learning and
price discovery. This omission does not have a qualitative effect on any of our conclusions.
In addition to the data reported in this paper, we also ran a separate series of “perfect
compliance” experiments for the low and high standard with uniform permit allocations. These
experiments were identical to those described in this paper, except that emissions were assumed
to exactly equal the final permit balance; that is, noncompliance was not allowed and audits were
unnecessary. As expected, observed prices and quantities in these experiment quickly converged
to the competitive equilibrium. Therefore, we are confident that any deviations from the
competitive prediction in the discussion below reflect treatment effects related to the compliance
decision and are not artifacts of the subject pool or experimental design.8

8

The results from our “perfect compliance” experiments are available upon request.
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4.1 General patterns in market experiments
Table 2 presents some summary statistics of permit prices. Note that mean and median prices
tend to be higher than the competitive equilibrium prediction, but they move as expected: prices
are higher when the aggregate standard is reduced and when the marginal expected penalty is
increased. Note, however, that with the HighStandard treatments, for a given marginal expected
penalty, mean and median prices are higher for the nonuniform initial allocation of permits.
This, of course, is not consistent with the conventional hypothesis that behavior and market
outcomes under emissions trading programs are independent of the initial allocation of permits.
Table 3 presents some summary statistics for individual violations. Mean and median
violations also move as expected. Given the aggregate standard, they tend to be lower with
higher marginal expected penalties, and given the enforcement strategy, they tend to be lower
with the HighStandard. Conceptually, this latter result is due to the lower permit prices resulting
from a higher aggregate standard.
We note an interesting pattern in mean and median violations that plays an important role in
how we analyze and interpret violation choices. The competitive equilibrium prediction is that
individual violations should be uniform across subjects in each treatment. However, mean and
median violation levels clearly differ by subject type, but whether HighMAC subjects tend
toward higher or lower violations than LowMAC subjects appears to depend on the initial
allocation of permits. In particular, consider the eight uniform allocation treatments. The
HighMAC subjects are predicted to be the net buyers of permits in these treatments, and they
clearly tend toward higher violations than the LowMAC subjects. On the other hand, for the four
nonuniform allocation treatments, the LowMAC subjects are predicted to be the permit buyers,
and they are the ones that tend toward higher violations. It appears that the differences in
violations by subject type may be determined in part by how the initial allocation of permits
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determines whether subjects will be net buyers or sellers of permits. This speculation is easily
tested and we will do so shortly.

4.2 Market regression results and tests of hypotheses
Table 4 presents the results of a linear random effects model of the permit price. The dependent
variable is the price of each trade in period t = 2,…,12 of group j = 1,…,27. The marginal
expected penalty, the aggregate standard, and the initial allocation are modeled as fixed effects.
Assuming risk neutral subjects, since the Medium(πH) and Medium(πL) enforcement strategies
have the same marginal expected penalties, in theory both should lead to identical market
outcomes. A test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the dummy variables for the
Medium(πH) and Medium(πL) treatments are equal cannot be rejected at any conventional level of
significance (Wald χ2(1) = 0.92, p = 0.34). Thus, decreasing monitoring and increasing penalties,
but leaving the marginal expected penalty function unchanged had no affect on market prices.
The price estimation results in Table 4 confirm the impressions we reached by comparing
average prices across treatments. The coefficients for the three marginal expected penalties are
increasing, indicating that increased enforcement puts upward pressure on the equilibrium price.
The NonUniform coefficient is positive and significant, as we expected from our perusal of the
average price results, even though theory predicts otherwise. Lastly, the coefficient on
HighStandard is negative and significant, indicating the unsurprising result that permit prices fall
with a greater supply of permits.
Table 5 presents the results of a two linear random effects models for individual violations.
Model 1 estimates the effects of the treatment variables on violations. Model 2 adds the
interaction effects needed to test Hypothesis 2, which requires that we capture all possible
combinations of subject type and treatment cells in Table 2. Using an instrumental variable
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approach, PriceHat is the estimated price from the model in Table 4. NetSeller is a fixed effect
that equals one if the subject is predicted to be a net seller (HighMAC subjects for the
nonuniform allocations and LowMAC subjects for the uniform allocations). HighMAC is a fixed
effect that equals one for HighMAC subjects. Note the negative and significant impact of
enforcement, and the positive and significant impact of price. These are consistent with the
theoretical model we presented in section 2.
While comparing mean and median violations across treatments, we suggested that
differences in violations by subject type may be determined in part by how the initial allocation
of permits determines whether subjects will be net buyers or sellers of permits. This is confirmed
by the estimation results. In Model 1, the NetSeller coefficient is negative and significant.
Although NetSeller is not significant in Model 2, a test of the joint hypothesis that NetSeller and
the four terms interacted with NetSeller are all equal to zero is rejected (Wald χ2(5) = 27.6, p =
0.00). On the other hand, the coefficient on HighMAC is small and not statistically significant in
both Models 1 and 2.9
Hypothesis 1 asserts that individual violations are independent of any subject-level
characteristic. Our tests of this hypothesis are mixed. We have strong support for the hypothesis
that violations are independent of differences in subjects’ marginal abatement costs. However,
individual violations are not independent of how the initial allocation of permits determines
which subjects will sell permits and which will buy them. The implications of these results for
targeted enforcement are clear. A regulator that is motivated to find and penalize those firms
with higher violations has some justification for targeting firms that buy permits, but has no
reason to target firms on the basis of information regarding individual abatement costs.
9

With Model 2, each of the four interaction terms containing HighMAC is not statistically significant. We also fail
to reject the joint hypothesis that HighMAC and these four interaction terms are all equal to zero (Wald χ2(5) =
0.37, p = 0.996).
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Although we find that permit buyers tend to have greater violation levels, it does not
necessarily follow that a regulator that wishes to direct his enforcement effort to where it is most
productive should target these firms. The estimates of the marginal productivity of enforcement
in Table 6 reflect the sensitivity of violation choices by subject type to changes in enforcement
pressure for a given aggregate standard and initial allocation. The values in the HighMAC and
LowMAC columns are the estimated marginal changes in individual violations as enforcement is
increased. Of course, these marginal effects have to include both the direct effects of
enforcement and the indirect effects through the change in the permit price. Letting ∆E denote a
change in enforcement, given an aggregate standard and initial allocation of permits, we
calculated ∆v i / ∆E + (∆v i / ∆p)(∆p / ∆E ), i = {HighMAC , LowMAC}, for each increase in
enforcement, aggregate standard, and initial allocation of permits. ∆v i / ∆E is the direct effect of
the change in enforcement, while (∆v i / ∆p ) × (∆p / ∆E ) is the indirect price effect. Values for

∆v i / ∆E and ∆v i / ∆p were calculated using Model 2 in Table 5, and ∆p / ∆E was calculated
using the price equation in Table 4.
The last column of Table 6 contains the p-values for a test of the hypothesis that the marginal
productivity of enforcement is equal across subject types.10 Note that the estimates of these
marginal effects are consistently higher for the HighMAC subjects when the initial allocation of
permit is uniform, but these effects are higher for the LowMAC subjects when the initial
allocation is not uniform. However, none of the differences in marginal productivities between
subject types are statistically significant. Thus, we have strong support for Hypothesis 2—the
marginal productivity of enforcement is independent of differences in subjects’ abatement costs
10

Although Table 6 compares subjects based on marginal abatement costs, the results would be identical if we
instead compared them based on whether they were predicted to be net sellers or buyers. This is because all
HighMAC subjects are net buyers with a uniform allocation and net sellers with a nonuniform allocation (the
reverse is true for LowMAC subjects).
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and initial allocation of permits. This suggest that a regulator that seeks to direct his enforcement
effort to where it is most productive does not have a statistically significant justification for
doing so on the basis of firm-level characteristics.

4.3 Standards
We do not expect this “no targeting” policy prescription to hold when permits are not tradable.
Table 7 presents summary statistics for our fixed standards experiments with a uniform
allocation of both low and high aggregate standards; we did not conduct any nonuniform
allocation treatments.11 Recall that these standards experiments were identical to the permit
market experiments, except that subjects were not able to trade their initial permit allocation. As
predicted, HighMAC subjects tended to have greater violation levels. The estimation results in
Table 8 confirm this: the coefficient for HighMAC subjects is positive and highly significant.
Moreover, the negative and significant coefficient for HighStandard indicates that individual
violation levels tend to decrease as the standard is relaxed. Therefore, we have strong support for
Hypothesis 3 and the enforcement implication that a regulator who is motivated to find and
penalize firms with higher violations has justification for targeting firms with higher marginal
abatement costs and lower emissions standards.
We use the interaction effects of Model 2 in Table 8 to test for differences in the marginal
productivity of enforcement. Similar to Table 6 for the case of emissions trading, Table 9
includes the marginal productivity of enforcement under fixed standards and presents the results
of tests for the equality of these values across subject types. Hypothesis 4 posits that violations of
subjects with higher marginal abatement costs will be more responsive to changes in
enforcement. This is true with our experimental design except in two cases. With a low standard,
11

This implies that we have one low and one high individual standard for both HighMAC and LowMAC subjects.
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our prediction is that the change from the low marginal expected penalty to either of the medium
marginal expected penalties has the same effect on violations for both subject types (see Table
7); this is simply an artifact of the experimental design, in particular that emissions choices are
discrete. As expected, when enforcement changes from Low to Medium(πH) there is not a
statistically significant difference in the marginal productivity of this change across subject types
(p = 0.78). However, there is the unanticipated significant difference in marginal productivities
when enforcement changes from Low to Medium(πL) (p = 0.02). More to the main point of
Hypothesis 4, however, we find that marginal productivity of enforcement is significantly higher
for the HighMAC subjects for six of the eight cases in which we expect to observe this
difference.
Hypothesis 4 also posits that the marginal productivity of increased enforcement is higher
when individual standards (defined by the initial permit allocation) are lower. Observe in Table 9
that for each subject type the effect of each change in enforcement is greater when they face the
low standard. However, these differences are statistically significant in only two of the five
comparisons for the HighMAC subjects, and in only one of the five comparisons for the Low

MAC subjects.
Although are results concerning Hypothesis 4 are mixed, we do have strong support for
the policy recommendation that, under fixed standards, regulators who are motivated to direct
their enforcement resources to where they will be most effective are justified in targeting firms
with higher marginal abatement costs. For the purposes of this paper, however, the most
important message is that while firm-level characteristics are important determinants of the
effectiveness of enforcement under command-and-control standards, the marginal productivity of
enforcement does not depend on these characteristics under a competitive emissions trading
program.
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5. Conclusions

Compliance behavior in emissions trading programs is fundamentally different from compliance
behavior under emissions standards. Conceptually, the compliance choices of risk neutral firms
that operate in a competitive emissions trading program are independent of parametric
differences in their abatement costs and their initial allocations of permits. Therefore, regulators
have no justification for targeting their enforcement efforts either to find and punish those firms
that tend to higher violations, or to maximize the productivity of their enforcement efforts in
reducing aggregate violations. On the other hand, since the compliance choices of firms that face
fixed emissions standards depend on their abatement costs and the standards they face, regulators
will be motivated to target firms with higher marginal abatement costs and those that face lower
standards.
The results of our laboratory experiments generally support the conclusions of theoretical
models of risk neutral compliance behavior in emissions trading programs, but not completely
so. We found that the subjects’ violations are independent of differences in their abatement
costs, but their violations are not independent of how the initial allocation of permits determines
which of them will sell permits and which will buy permits. Those subjects that were predicted
to buy permits tended to have higher violation levels than those who were predicted to sell
permits. Despite this, we found that individual differences in abatement costs or initial
allocations of permits do not have a statistically significant impact on the marginal productivity
of increased enforcement in reducing individual violations. Concerning targeted enforcement,
then, regulators may be motivated to direct their enforcement efforts at firms that are net buyers
of permits it they wish to find and penalize the most significant violators, but there is no
theoretical reason or statistical evidence that targeting firms based on firm-specific
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characteristics to reduce aggregate violations is a productive strategy.
We also ran a series of experiments in which subjects faces fixed standards. Our results
from these experiments are mostly consistent with the conclusions of a model of risk neutral
compliance behavior. More importantly, however, the results serve to highlight how compliance
behavior and, by implication, the design of enforcement strategies are fundamentally different
under emissions trading and fixed standards.
Our finding that net buyers of permits tended toward higher violation in our emissions
trading experiments could be consistent with an endowment effect that has been documented in a
number of experimental settings (for a review see Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1990). That
net sellers of permits tended to have lower violations than buyers suggests that they tended to
hold on to more permits than one would expect in a competitive equilibrium. While we find the
possibility of an endowment effect intriguing, we hesitate to attribute our result to this
phenomenon, because our experiments were not specifically designed to test for this effect;
therefore we are unable to determine whether this effect is the source of the difference in the
violation levels of permit buyers and seller. Moreover, market experiments like ours that use
induced values in a double auction typically report highly efficient outcomes (Smith 1982).
Indeed, as already mentioned, this is precisely what we observe in our “perfect compliance”
experiments. Therefore, the initial allocation effect that we observe must be related in some way
to the introduction of the compliance decision. While it is possible that the compliance decision
induces an endowment effect, further research is needed to determine whether this is the case.
Our hypotheses concerning compliance behavior were formed from models of risk neutral
firms; however, individual risk preferences are a relevant consideration in any model of
compliance. In the theoretical literature on compliance and enforcement of emissions trading
only Malik (1990) allows for non-neutral risk preferences, but he does not provide clear
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predictions of the qualitative impacts of enforcement on violation levels. Our experience
suggests that specific predictions about these effects require severely limiting assumptions about
agents’ utility functions. Interestingly, there may be a conceptual basis for focusing on risk
neutrality. Rabin (2000) has demonstrated that expected utility theory implies that people are
approximately risk neutral when stakes are small, such as in our laboratory setting.
In our case, the model with risk-neutral firms performs quite well. It provides the
comparative static results that are important for examining the potential for targeted
enforcement, and the results are largely supported by the experimental data. In general we do
believe, however, that experimental studies that examine compliance behavior in various settings
could benefit from information about subjects’ risk preferences. Unfortunately, there is no
consensus about how to elicit these preferences. We believe that this is another important area
for future research.
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Table 1. Experimental design

Marginal expected
penalty

Uniform Allocation

Nonuniform
Allocation

Low
Standard

High
Standard

High
Standard

High

Both market &
standards

Both market &
standards

Market only

Medium(πH)

Both market &
standards

Both market &
standards

Market only

Medium(πL)

Both market &
standards

Both market &
standards

Market only

Low

Both market &
standards

Both market &
standards

Market only

Each cell repeated 3 times with 8 participants per group. Data from one subject dropped from the treatment
with the Low marginal expected penalty and Low Standard due to bankruptcy after 3 periods.
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Table 2. Permit Price Summary Statistics
Marginal Expected Competitive
Penalty
Equilibrium Mean
Low
Standard

High

12.57

12.68

0.95

9.61

9.30

1.18

13.26

13.50

1.84

8.11

7.90

1.55

7.94

8.00

0.76

9.74

9.00

2.40

Medium(πH)

7.09

7.25

1.02

Medium(πH)
Nonuniform

7.79

7.60

1.10

6.74

6.85

0.58

Medium(πL)
Nonuniform

7.24

7.20

1.39

Low

3.97

4.00

0.74

6.50

7.00

1.36

Medium(πH)
Medium(πL)
Low

12 – 13
8 - 8.20
6

High
High
Nonuniform
High Standard

Standard
Median Deviation

Medium(πL)

Low
Nonuniform

8

6 - 6.20

4
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Table 3. Summary Statistics for Individual Violations (Emissions Trading)
Marginal
Competitive
Expected Penalty Equilibrium

Low
Standard

High

0

Medium(πH)
3

Medium(πL)
Low

(4 or 5)

High
High
Nonuniform

0

High Standard

Medium(πH)
Medium(πH)
Nonuniform
1

Medium(πL)
Medium(πL)
Nonuniform
Low
Low
Nonuniform

(2 or 3)

Firm
MAC
High

Mean
0.4

Low

0.2

0

0.5

High

3.1

3

1.0

Low

2.0

2

1.5

High

1.9

1

2.0

Low

1.2

1

1.4

High

3.7

3

2.0

Low

3.3

3

1.5

High

0.1

0

0.5

Low

0.1

0

0.4

High

0.1

0

0.4

Low

0.2

0

0.5

High

1.2

1

1.1

Low

0.7

0

1.3

High

0.6

0

1.2

Low

1.3

1

1.2

High

1.4

1

1.3

Low

0.8

0

1.5

High

0.8

0

2.3

Low

1.5

1

1.7

High

3.6

3

2.4

Low

1.4

1

1.3

High

1.8

1

2.0

Low

2.8

2

2.0
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Standard
Median Deviation
0
0.8

Table 4. Random Effects Estimation of Permit Price
Variable
Intercept

Permit Price

8.32 (0.50)***

HighMEP

4.08 (0.58)***

Medium(πH)MEP

2.28 (0.58)***

Medium(πL)MEP

2.84 (0.58)***

HighStandard

-4.20 (0.50)***

NonUniform Allocation

1.25 (0.50)***

Wald χ2(5)

126.96***

4060 observations. Standard error in parenthesis. ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 5. Random Effects Estimation of Individual Violations (Emissions Trading)
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Intercept

2.44 (0.27)***

NetSeller

-0.65 (0.15) ***

-1.26 (-0.77)

HighMAC

0.05 (0.15) ***

0.34 (0.77)

HighMEP

-2.98 (0.24) ***

-3.51 (0.56) ***

Medium(πH)MEP

-1.49 (0.21) ***

-1.71 (0.43) ***

Medium(πL)MEP

-1.77 (0.21) ***

-2.00 (0.42) ***

PriceHat

0.10 (0.03) ***

2.60 (0.76) ***

0.11 (0.11)

PriceHat×NetSeller

0.01 (0.11)

PriceHat×HighMAC

-0.04 (0.11)

HighMAC×HighMEP

0.05 (0.59)

HighMAC×Medium(πH)MEP

0.01 (0.46)

HighMAC×Medium(πL)MEP

-0.01 (0.45)

NetSeller×HighMEP

1.00 (0.59) *

NetSeller×Medium(πH)MEP

0.43 (0.46)

NetSeller×Medium(πL)MEP

0.48 (0.45)

Wald χ2

211.9***

221.5***

3168 observations. Standard error in parenthesis. * p < 0.10; *** p < 0.01
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High Standard
Nonuniform

High Standard
Uniform

Low Standard
Uniform

Table 6 – Marginal Productivity of Enforcement by Firm Type (Emissions Trading)
Enforcement Change

HighMAC
Firms

LowMAC
Firms

Test of Equality
(p-value)

Low to Medium(πL)

-1.66

-0.93

0.73

Low to Medium(πH)

-1.54

-1.02

0.58

Low to High

-3.08

-1.89

0.38

Medium(πL)to High

-1.43

-0.95

0.32

Medium(πH) to High

-1.54

-0.87

0.16

Low to Medium(πL)

-1.79

-1.16

0.59

Low to Medium(πH)

-1.45

-0.87

0.68

Low to High

-3.15

-1.99

0.32

Medium(πL)to High

-1.35

-0.83

0.27

Medium(πH) to High

-1.70

-1.12

0.23

Low to Medium(πL)

-1.42

-1.87

0.56

Low to Medium(πH)

-1.11

-1.52

0.63

Low to High

-2.13

-3.10

0.63

Medium(πL)to High

-0.71

-1.24

0.43

Medium(πH) to High

-1.03

-1.59

0.40
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Table 7. Summary Statistics for Individual Violations (Fixed Standards)

Low
Standard

Marginal
Competitive
Expected Penalty Equilibrium
1
High
0

Medium(πH)
Medium(πL)
Low

High Standard

High
Medium(πH)
Medium(πL)
Low

Firm
MAC
High

Mean
0.6

Low

0.1

0

0.3

5

High

4.1

4

2.1

1

Low

1.2

1

0.6

5

High

3.0

2

3.6

1

Low

1.4

1

1.5

7

High

5.0

4

2.2

3

Low

2.1

2

0.8

0

High

0.6

0

1.2

0

Low

0.0

0

0.2

3

High

2.7

3

0.8

0

Low

0.1

0

0.3

3

High

2.2

1.0

2.5

0

Low

0.3

0

0.5

5

High

3.6

3

2.1

1

Low

0.5

0

0.5
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Standard
Median Deviation
1
1.0

Table 8. Random Effects Estimation of Individual Violations (Fixed Standards)
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Intercept

2.27 (0.24)***

2.02 (0.31) ***

HighMAC

1.99 (0.20) ***

3.04 (0.36) ***

HighMEP

-2.47 (0.28) ***

-1.93 (0.48) ***

Medium(πH)MEP

-0.79 (0.28) ***

-0.84 (0.48) *

Medium(πL)MEP

-1.07 (0.28) ***

-0.59 (0.48)

HighStandard

-0.94 (0.20) ***

-1.51 (0.36) ***
-2.57 (0.62) ***

HighMAC× HighMEP
HighMAC× Medium(πH)MEP

-0.17 (0.62)

HighMAC× Medium(πL)MEP

-1.47 (0.62) **

HighStandard× HighMEP

1.44 (0.62) **

HighStandard × Medium(πH)MEP

0.45 (0.62)

HighStandard× Medium(πL)MEP

0.38 (0.62)

HighStandard× HighMEP × HighMAC

0.07 (0.72)

HighStandard× Medium(πH)MEP × HighMAC

-0.35 (0.72)

HighStandard× Medium(πL)MEP× HighMAC

0.28 (0.73)

Wald χ2

211.9 ***

287.1 ***

1337 observations. Standard error in parenthesis. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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HighStandard

LowStandard

Table 9 – Marginal Productivity of Enforcement by Firm Type (Fixed Standards)
Enforcement Change

HighMAC
Firms

LowMAC
Firms

Test of equality
(p-value)

Low to Medium(πL)

-2.07

-0.60

0.02

Low to Medium(πH)

-1.01

-0.84

0.78

Low to High

-4.50

-1.93

0.00

Medium(πL)to High

-2.43

-1.33

0.13

Medium(πH) to High

-3.49

-1.10

0.00

Low to Medium(πL)

-1.41

-0.22

0.06

Low to Medium(πH)

-0.91

-0.39

0.41

Low to High

-2.98

-0.49

0.00

Medium(πL) to High

-1.57

-0.26

0.07

Medium(πH) to High

-2.07

-0.10

0.01
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Appendix: Instructions Summary12

Thank you for agreeing to participate in today’s experiment. You have all seen a version of this
experiment before. Before we begin, I would like to review the instructions for today’s
experiment.
It is very important to remember that although the experiment may be similar, some or all
of the numbers may have changed. Do NOT assume that any of the information or results from a
previous experiment will be useful in helping you to make your decisions today.
The purpose of the experiment is to give you an opportunity to earn as much money as
possible. What you earn will depend on your decisions, as well as the decisions of others. As
before you can produce as many units as you want regardless of the number of permits you own,
but you could face a financial penalty if you do not own a permit for each unit you produce.

•

During the period, you can earn money in two ways:
1. Produce units of the fictitious good. For each unit you produce, you will earn a
specified amount of money that will be added to your cash balance.
2. Sell permits in the permit market. The selling price you receive for a permit will be
added to your cash balance.

•

Money will be subtracted from your cash balance if:
1. You choose to buy additional permits. The purchase price you pay will be deducted
from your cash balance.
2. You are audited and if the total number of units you produce exceeds the number of
permits you own.

Production Highlights
•

Your Earnings from Production table tells you how many units you can produce and
how much you will earn from each unit you produce. You might earn a different
amount of money for each unit produced.

12

•

Production of each unit takes a specified amount of time

•

You can only produce one unit at a time.

This instructions summary was given to students and read aloud by the experimenter before each session. During
the trainers, subjects read a more detailed set of online instructions. The text of the detailed instructions is
available from the authors upon request.

•

The Production Timer tells you how much time is left for you to produce more units.

•

In order to start production of a unit, there must be sufficient time on the Production
Timer to complete production of the unit.

•

To start production or to place an order for additional units, click the plus (+) button.
If production is idle, then production will begin immediately.

•

You can cancel units that have been ordered if production has not yet begun. To do
so, click the minus (–) button.

•

Earnings from the units produced are automatically added to your cash balance when
production is completed.

•

The last row of the “Earnings from Production” table tells you the maximum number
of units you are able to produce.

•

Under the “Earnings from Production” table, you can see the production status of
each unit (produced, in production, or planned).

Permit Market Highlights
•

You will be given an opportunity to buy and/or sell permits in the Permit Market.

•

There are 4 ways in which you can participate in the market:

1. Make an offer to buy a permit.
a. To do so, enter your price next to the My Buying Price and click Buy.
b. All buying prices must be GREATER than the Current Buying Price.
2. Make an offer to sell a permit.
a. To do so, enter your price next to the My Selling Price and click Sell.
b. All selling prices must be LOWER than the Current Selling Price.
3. Purchase a permit at the Current Selling Price.
a. To do so, enter the Current Selling Price next to My Buying Price
b. or click the Buy button next to the Current Selling Price.
4. Sell a permit at the Current Buying Price.
a. To do so, enter the Current Buying Price next to My Selling Price
b. or click the Sell button next to the Current Buying Price.

•

After each trade is completed, your permit balance will be automatically updated. Your
cash balance will automatically be updated to reflect price you paid to buy the permit, or
the price you received for selling the permit. This is shown in the My Balances section of
your screen.

Auditing Highlights
•

The computer monitor always knows how many permits you own and your cash balance.
The computer does not know how many units you actually produced unless you are
audited.

•

There is an XX% chance that you will be audited, and (1-XX)% chance you will not be
audited.

•

If you are audited, the computer monitor will check to see how many units you actually
produced. If the number of units you produced exceeds the number of permits you own,
you will receive a financial penalty. The Permit Shortfall Table lists the penalties you
will face.

To summarize, your total earnings for the period will be calculated as follows:
Your initial cash balance
+ Earnings from production of the good
+ Selling price for permits you sell in the permit market
– Purchase price for permits you buy in the permit market
– Penalties for a permit shortfall (only if you are audited and if you over produced)
= Total earnings for the period
At the end of the experiment, we will add up your total earnings for each period and you will be
paid in cash for these earnings. Please raise your hand if you have any questions.

